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Abstract
Though stock prices are commonly not considered an integral part of central
banks’ monetary policy strategy, financial asset prices are highly relevant because
they exert important impacts on inflation, on the real sphere of the economy,
and on the financial system. This paper illustrates the evolution of selected
primary and secondary equity markets and elaborates divergences and
similarities between the pricing of old and new economy stocks. It is shown that
the valuation of new economy stocks is subject to enhanced contingency. Prices
of new economy stocks ceteris paribus react more sensitively to new information
and modifications to external assumptions. From both a microeconomic as well
as a macroeconomic point of view, the growth projections implicit in price
earnings ratios observed in recent years seem unrealistic. Furthermore, from a
utility maximising perspective, it seems unlikely that the observed shift in
investment away from old economy stocks and into new economy stocks could
have been achievable without a change in the aggregate risk preference. Panel
regression analysis based on 219 EURO STOXX firms, though, confirms a
significant impact of firm-specific and macroeconomic fundamentals on monthly
returns for old economy companies as well as for telecommunication, media
and technology (TMT) firms. The null-hypothesis of no statistically significant
difference between TMT firms and non-TMT firms with respect to the role of
firm-specific and macroeconomic fundamentals in explaining monthly stock
returns is rejected. While theoretical considerations and empirical findings
suggest that the monetary policy stance remains an important factor driving
equity valuation, the growing passion for stocks and the more volatile pricing of
new economy stocks bear important implications for central bank policy making. 
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Central banks and stock markets: 
an introduction
Few expressions have been hyped as much as the new economy has been
recently. Still, the concept of the new economy phenomenon remains nebulous.
Commonly, economists focus on the achievements of the US economy
throughout the second half of the 90’s, namely the simultaneous robust and
exceptional economic growth and sustained remarkably modest price
acceleration. Though the uncertainty applies to its driving forces as well, the
emergence of a new economy is commonly considered a result of the confluence
of advances in information and communications technology (ICT), improved
macroeconomic management (both fiscal and monetary) and international
elements (e.g., globalisation, economic activity abroad, foreign exchange),
where pride of place is commonly going to the ICT revolution.
1 Contrary to
numerous studies on the new economy
2, this document is not to assess the
emergence of “higher speed limits”. Instead, the aim of the document is:
i) To describe what makes the pricing of new economy stocks so special
(section 2).
ii) To illustrate the rapid rise in equity prices, notably among new economy
stocks, which accompanied the emergence of the so-called new economy
phenomenon and to investigate its plausibility from a microeconomic and a
macroeconomic perspective (sections 3 and 4).
iii) To investigate whether the aggregate risk preference of equity investors has
been subject to change and to discuss the role of fundamentals in explaining
equity returns in recent years (sections 5 and 6). 
iv) To elaborate implications of recent stock market trends for central bank policy
(section 7).
Though stock prices are commonly not considered an integral part of central
banks’ monetary policy strategy, financial asset prices are highly relevant because
they exert important impacts on inflation, on the real economy, and on the
financial system. Final demand, for example, is affected through both demand
for consumption and demand for investment. 
As for consumption, economic theory provides three main impacting channels.
First, increases in financial asset prices are generally considered an increase in
permanent income which, according to Friedman, translates into augmented
private consumption (“wealth effect”). Second, Friedman’s permanent income
theory states that, in deciding on individual consumption, economic agents rely
on their expected permanent income. Thus, once changes in equity prices incite
agents to modify their expectations with respect to income generated by non-
equity wealth, even consumption behaviour of non-equity holders may change.
78
Third, changes in financial asset prices affect the borrowing capacity of
households. If the latter drops, households will readapt their portfolio by
reducing current consumption and increasing savings. 
Investment demand of non-financial firms, too, may be affected via three
channels. First, decreasing equity prices may imply a reduction of Tobin’s q (i.e.,
stock market valuation of a given company over its existing net capital stock),
thereby rendering new capital more expensive relative to the stock existing.
3
Second, investment activity could suffer from decreasing equity prices according
to the flexible accelerator theory.
4 When coupled to the multiplier concept,
changes in investment may bring about a more than proportional change in
production. Third, decreasing stock market prices imply a reduction of the net
value of firms and renders credit-taking more expensive and difficult.
Another important transmission channel from financial asset prices to the real
economy runs through balance sheets of financial institutions. In a direct way, a
harsh downward correction of stock prices would deteriorate balance sheets
within the banking sector and reduce banks’ lending capacity. Furthermore,
rapidly shrinking asset prices may impact on the real sphere in an indirect
manner by deteriorating the solvency of the private sector in general (through
diminishing value of collateral held against loans). Once banks sell such collateral
due to clients’ non-ability to match their payment obligations, additional
pressure is exerted on asset prices.
5
Given that financial markets are highly integrated, the recent sharp fall in equity
prices is commonly considered a risk not only for the USA, but for the global
economy.
6 Finally, the mere anticipation of significantly shrinking equity prices
may render specific currencies less attractive for international investors, thereby
affecting underlying capital flows and exchange rates.
7 Thus, due to their impact
on central bank information variables, intermediate targets and price stability
and given the increasing passion for equity as well as the nature of new economy
stocks, central banks are asked to monitor in detail the evolution of stock
markets.
3. According to the q theory, firm investment is a function of q. If market capitalisation exceeds the value
of the company’s assets, firms are encouraged to invest given that the expected revenue generated by
the assets is higher than their costs. Conversely, if q remains below one, a firm is supposed to disinvest. 
4. Felderer/Homburg (1994).
5. Putten/Vergnaud (2001).
6. As for the US, according to the OECD, a 20 % decline in equity prices – when coupled to a 4,5 % decrease
in marginal consumption propensity – transmits into a 1,2 % decrease in private consumption. This, in
turn, would correspond to a 0,6 % reduction in the annual growth rate (Boone/Giorno/Richardson
(1998)).
7. From the perspective of the European Central Bank this may be particularly relevant for capital flows
from the euro area to the US. According to the FMI, a 20 % reduction in equity prices may reduce the
value of the US Dollar relative to the Euro by around one fifth (IMF (2000b)).9
2
Peculiarities of new economy firms
2.1 Specific characteristics of new economy firms
2.1.1 The field of activity
In recent years, the valuation of stocks – in particular that issued by new
economy firms – has been extensively discussed among the public, researchers
and financial market practitioners. Still, there is no unanimous understanding as
to what characterises a new economy firm. Two possible properties in
characterising new economy firms refer to the field of activity and the business
model. With respect to the field of activity, again, there is no unanimity. Whereas
some economists analysing macro aspects of the new economy phenomenon
consider but the ICT segments 
8, others refer to the telecommunication, media
and technology sectors (TMT).
9 Financial market institutions and their products
related to the new economy, however, indicate a larger understanding reflecting
that some entire stock market indices have become synonyms for the new
economy (e.g., the German NEMAX and the US American NASDAQ). The
NEMAX, for example, provides as much as nine high-tech sectors (see figure 1).
The field of activity constitutes an important property underlying stock market
valuation since it is subject to specific assumptions with respect to growth
potential, future effective growth rates, corporate pricing power, barriers to
market entry, etc. (see box 1).
8. See, for example, Houben/Kakes (2001).
9. In general, the TMT approach embraces the ICT as well as other industries. This approach, however,
requires a definition of the technology segment (see, for example, Brierley/Kearns (2001)). 10
BOX 1: Key properties of selected technology-based sectors 
10
Growth projections for the telecommunication sector are bright. Different scenarios apply to
the existing business areas within this sector. First, whereas the voice transmission segment
may lose pace, data transmission may benefit from rapid growth. Second, mobile and fixed
communication may converge in terms of volume and price. One common element across
business fields is rapid price erosion.
Potential growth in the media sector is giant due to the basically unlimited range of
information provided and the increasing demand for specific information. Marginal cost of
production and distribution are exceptionally low. However, barriers to market entry are low
and prices subject to rapid erosion.
Growth potential and uncertainty in the software sector are substantial. Connectivity being
the focal issue, the potential success may be very high, but strictly limited to a few players.
Start-up companies depend essentially on rapid initial growth. Established companies benefit
from significant market entry barriers.
The biotechnological product life cycle is different from common product and IT product
cycles (slower product obsolescence, longer research and development phases).
11 Ultimately,
risks may be binary and subject to ethical and/or legal criteria. In merchandising their
products, biotech firms depend on the financing power and the logistics of pharmaceutical
multinationals. Similar to the health sector and the IT sector, the biotech sector is subject to
narrow markets due to high fixed research and development costs.
12
The technology sector is relatively heterogeneous. Firms benefit from strong strategic
positioning in well-defined markets and low price pressure. They may be highly dependent
on critical components, which only make up a small fraction of their business in terms of
value added.
Providers of new financial services face limited possibilities for business expansion. The
frequency of financial transactions, in general, is sensitive to the overall market stance.
Financial products are highly substitutable implying low corporate pricing power. Market
entry barriers are barely existing.
Figure 1: The share of high-tech segments in the NEMAX ALL SHARE Index [%]
Source: Deutsche Börse AG, own calculations.























Industr. & Ind. Services
Internet11
2.1.2 The business model
The business model may relate to numerous firm properties. Apart from sector-
specific elements (such as the upside potential and the term of revenue
generation), the characteristics specific to new economy firms, as a baseline,
refer to their affinity to innovation, the kind of techniques employed, the source
of their know-how as well as the financing sources for research and development
activities (see table 1).
Table 1: Selected business model characteristics of old and new economy
companies
OLD ECONOMY COMPANIES NEW ECONOMY COMPANIES
Relatively conservative Innovative
Use of established  Use of new cutting edge 
techniques techniques
Historical know-how  Experimental know-how
and expertise
Use profits to fund  Use investors money to fund 
research and development research and development
2.2 What makes the valuation of new economy firms so special?
The specific character of new economy firms has important implications for
equity valuation. Any assessment of new economy stocks will probably be
subject to a higher level of contingency than the valuation of old economy stocks
due to several reasons. 
First, new economy companies are different in that they use new technologies
and rely on new and probably more diverse business models. Obviously, any
valuation of these is conditional upon the limited historical experience among
potential investors. 
Second, new economy firms frequently have been created only recently
meaning that any valuation may not rely on back data. 
Third, new economy firms much more than traditional firms rely on intangible
assets (notably human capital). The greater role for intangibles creates additional
uncertainty: on the one hand, there is currently no technique available allowing
for a reliable assessment of such assets. On the other hand, the higher fraction
of investment into intangible assets immediately and to the full extent shows up
as costs in their balance sheets thereby reducing accounted current profits and




























Fourth, the commitment of new economy firms to investment and intangible
assets implies that investors buy future growth expectations at the expense of
current earnings. Any valuation of new economy firms, therefore, relies
increasingly on expected rather than actual figures. 
Fifth, the valuation of new economy stocks may be more sentiment and/or news
flows driven than that of old economy firms.
Sixth, prices of new economy stocks ceteris paribus react much stronger to given
changes in external growth or inflation assumptions due to the discount
leverage.
14
14.See also paragraph 4.2.
BOX 2: Valuation techniques
Comparable Company Analyses:
New economy companies and those not making profit are notoriously difficult to value, and
benchmarking them against a peer group is a common methodology.
Discounted Future Earnings:
Taking a representative measure of profitability and then discounting this back to present
value is used as a proxy for current profitability. This method is simpler than a full-blown
discounted cash flow analysis and relies on fewer assumptions. But the assumptions are,
though fewer, more influential and therefore must be implemented with caution.
Discounted Portfolio Valuation:
The value of some new economy companies lies not in their current, near-term, revenue
generation ability, but rather in the company’s potential to bring value-enhancing products
to the market. Such companies can have lumpy and unpredictable revenue streams that
make them unsuitable candidates for a comparable company analysis. One way to get
around this caveat is to assess each product in the company’s portfolio in terms of its
potential market and its probability of getting to market. A key driver is the likelihood of
getting to market and to this extent a set of probabilities – each representing a specific
development stage – is applied. Once the market potential and the likelihood to enter that
market has been estimated, a relatively aggressive discount rate is applied to obtain the net
present value of each product.
Risk-Adjusted Discounted Cash Flow:
This method is quite similar to the discounted portfolio method. Sales forecasts for the
products in pipeline are risk-adjusted and the net present value is derived by assuming long-
term growth rates, such as GDP growth. This method is primarily applied to later stage
earnings driven companies.
Traditional Criteria:
Frequently applied instruments are PE ratios (or PE to growth ratios), dividend discount
models, price to sales ratios and price to book ratios (PB ratios).13
Seventh, from an empirical point of view, changes in projections about sales and
profit growth themselves have been much more important for new economy
than for old economy firms.
15
Eighth, anticipating the business outlook for some new economy fields is more
difficult due to the massive price erosion, which they are commonly subject to.
Finally, valuation of new economy companies relies substantially on a qualitative
assessment of the strength, quality and experience of the management, which
mostly requires extensive on-site firm visits. Since these are frequently only
available to large wholesale investors, this may – despite ubiquitous ICT - lead
to structural valuation divergences between large institutional investors on the
one hand and small-size investors on the other hand. 
Apart from these sector-specific factors, there are also peripheral factors that
may drive stock prices differently than in the past and/or may affect new
economy stocks in a different way than old economy stocks. 
For example, the emergence of electronic trading platforms and online
brokerage has multiple achievements , such as more rapid trade execution and
settlement, permanent access and reduced transaction costs as well as increased
market liquidity. But they may also be conducive to contagion and/or intraday
trading. They enable non-institutional investors (i.e., new behavioural patterns
16)
to enter the markets, which may have unknown effects on valuation and its
volatility. Furthermore, electronic trading may have inclined dealers to
“spoofing”
17 and some characteristics of technology stocks – small float, high
volatility – appear well suited to investors who prefer these new channels of
communication and stock market trading. 
The increased role of index-linked management can amplify the spread of herd
behaviour and lead to self-sustaining price increases: when prices of certain
stocks rise, their relative weight in the index increases, thus prompting managers
to accumulate these shares within their benchmark portfolios.
18 This may be
particularly applicable to an environment characterised by small firm size and
asymmetrically distributed market capitalisation. 
Crowd behaviour may create financial bubbles according to the “bigger fool”
theory. This theory may better apply to new economy stocks (more volatile and
more sensitively reacting to modifications to external assumptions) since risk
taking preferences may allow for more extreme “bets” among investors. 
15.See, for example, the ad hoc announcements published by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad hoc-
Publizität (according to German securities law, listed firms are asked to publish any firm-specific, not
publicly known information that may significantly affect the price of its equity). 
16.For example, according to a recent study by Schroder Salomon Smith Barney, non-institutional investors
are particularly subject to certain patterns of investment conduct, such as the so-called psychological
representative heuristics (Handelsblatt, 19/20 October 2001). 
17.In fact, the National Association of Security Dealers, owner and regulator of NASDAQ, led investigations
concerning price manipulations in equity trading (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 August 2001).
18.Mouriaux/Verhille (2000). 14
Massive share buybacks may be one reason for a substantial increase in prices of
new economy stocks due to the narrow linkage with stock options, which have
become an increasingly popular way of remunerating staff within the new
economy sector. By buying back shares, the management can, in effect, inflate
its own pay – and, because stock options do not appear in the company’s
income statement, it can even do it without affecting recorded profits.
19
The spread of a global equity culture, increased wealth across population and
generation change (e.g., ageing baby-boomers anticipating retirement, younger
people better endowed with financial resources and enriched by inheritances)
may imply a reduction in the equity risk premium in general and a shift in
investment towards more volatile new economy stocks in particular.
20
The large media and marketing campaigns commonly organised prior to IPOs
may affect stock prices and volatility in a way unknown before (e.g., by
attracting an entirely new investor population, enhancing the news/sentiment
driven impact on stock valuation). The impact of non-anticipated news on stock
valuation is particularly relevant for high growth stocks.
19.The Economist (2001a). Note, however, that share buyback programs have been launched by old
economy companies too (e.g., in order to improve earnings per share). Anyway, the frequent use of
stock options by new economy firms may provide an additional incentive for employees to pursue more
closely the objective of bright stock market valuation. 
20.Hannah (2000).15
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On the evolution of stock markets 
from 1997 to 2001
3.1 The evolution of composite indices
From October 1998 to March 2000, it seems that the passion for equity
bewitched world stock markets. The unusually bullish valuation of stocks was
frequently seen in the light of the technological revolution, which notably the
new economy firms promised to bring about. Accordingly, equity price inflation
was less pronounced at the level of general stock market indices (e.g., the French
CAC40 (+ 150 %)
21 , the German DAX30 (+ 130 %)), and more so at the level
of “technology-based” indices (e.g., the German NEMAX (+ 1300 %), the US
American NASDAQ (+ 300 %)). Though the general trajectory taken by stock
markets is well known, two messages may be retained with respect to the period
from March 1997 to April 2001. First, the major fraction of the stock price
increases observed had been achieved within short periods of time. This is most
obvious for euro area and “technology-based” indices. Second, though the new
economy phenomenon is primarily associated with Anglo-Saxon economies in
general and the US American in particular, euro area stock market indices
performed stronger than Dow Jones and FTSE100. Interestingly, though the
navigation into the new economy was frequently characterised by
“Nasdaqmania”
22 , the relative increase in NASDAQ was only slightly superior to
increases in the broad French CAC40 index. 
3.2 The evolution of index components
Index components are mostly grouped by sectors.
23  Ideally, distinguishing by
sectors may eliminate fixed sector effects and allows abstracting from diverging
sector weights across stock market indices. Given its wide sector-based grouping
scheme and our particular interest in the euro area, in the following, the focus is
on the EURO STOXX. Whereas prices within old economy sectors (such as retail
and construction) evolved steadily (increasing by around 70 % compared with
their January 1997 score), TMT sectors increased by a stunning 400 %
(telecommunication, technology) or 200 % (media). The three new economy
sectors took off at the same time (from October 1999) and reached their zenith
within the same month (March 2000). Throughout the bull period, the EURO
STOXX telecommunication and technology sectors evolved in a remarkably
21.Approximate maximum increase relative to the corresponding scores observed in March 1997.
22.L’Echo, 8 May 2000.
23.For example, the NASDAQ index offers a 7-sector grouping scheme (i.e., Bank, Computer, Industrial,
Insurance, Other financial, Telecommunication and Transportation). The EURO STOXX index offers a
breakdown into 18 groupings (i.e., Auto, Bank, Basic resources, Chemical, Construction, Cyclical goods
and services, Energy, Financial services, Food and beverages, Healthcare, Industrial goods and services,
Insurance, Media, Non-cyclical goods and services, Retail, Technology, Telecommunication and Utilities).16
similar manner. At the same time, returns within the technology and the
telecommunication sector departed steadily from old economy stock yields.
Whereas throughout the 12 months prior to January 1998 correlation between
price increases in the telecommunication and the technology sectors on the one
hand and the retail sector on the other hand had been almost perfect (0,96 and
0,97), by January 2000 it was virtually zero and became even negative
afterwards. Given that from a macroeconomic perspective the most important
contribution of new technologies probably consists in the proliferation of
productivity gains across the entire economy (instead of higher productivity
within the ICT sector itself)
24 , it is questionable whether such a low degree of
correlation is sustainable. 
Apart from increasing more rapidly, new economy stock prices are commonly
considered more risky.
25 Throughout 1997, however, the standard deviation
within the telecommunication sector had been very similar to that observed
within the retail sector. By end 1999, volatility in telecommunication stocks
increased very rapidly and decreased again from April 2000 onwards. When
adjusting for scale effects, one observes that even in 2001 price volatility within
the new economy sectors remained on a very high level.
26 Within most old
economy sectors, price adjusted volatility was not subject to systematic
acceleration throughout the period considered. But the EURO STOXX new
economy sectors did not necessarily behave different from old economy sectors.
For example, the implicit “feasibility frontier” between monthly price increases
and relative price volatility has been similar throughout the period under
consideration.
3.3 Correlation between the United States and the euro area: the industrial
and the telecommunication sector
In order to illustrate whether and to what extent the more intense new economy
proliferation in the US is reflected by euro area stock prices we compare the
evolution of those two sectors appearing in both the EURO STOXX and the
NASDAQ (i.e., industry and telecommunication). The degree of co-movement may
vary substantially across sectors and time. For example, monthly rates of return on
industrial stocks correlated quite narrowly. The 12-month correlation coefficient
was at any time above 0,6, ranged steadily around 0,8 and reached its peak (0,86)
from September 1998 to August 1999. Conversely, correlation between US and
euro area telecommunication stock returns has been subject to considerable
changes. Whereas they hardly correlated at all in 1997 (correlation coefficient:
0,16), correlation increased rapidly reaching its peak from May 1999 to May 2000
(0,91). Although the main direction of rates of return pointed downwards from
April 2000 onwards, correlation decreased rather rapidly to 60 % recently. 
24.Oliner/Sichel (2000).
25.We follow common textbook theory in defining risk by volatility (see, for example, Baume (1991)). 
26.Within the technology sector relative volatility even increased in the aftermath of the stock price reversal
in April 2000.17
Figure 2: Changes in telecommunication and industrial stock prices:
correlation between the euro area and the US
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
Closing price volatility and intraday spread in both sectors evolved similarly
across the Atlantic though both measures indicate a slightly higher level of
volatility for stocks listed at NASDAQ. With respect to the telecommunication
sector, relative closing price volatility since end 2000 is very high again (similar
to the level observed by the turning point in March 2000) both within NASDAQ
and the EURO STOXX. The same holds for the intraday spread. Whereas by early
1998 the telecommunication intraday spread had been below 1 %, it exceeded
4 % (EURO STOXX) and 6 % (NEMAX) by March 2000. And again, a full year
after prices peaked, the intraday spread is still very high. 
In total, it seems that from mid 1999 until late 2000, the sector property (instead
of the country property) had been the overriding factor of the return pattern.
This seems to confirm the assumption that specific factors accompanying the
new economy (such as globalisation of product markets, ubiquity of ICT and
more integrated financial markets) reduced the relevance of country factors in
achieving the optimum portfolio diversification through lower dependency on
the country’s cyclical position, improved information gathering and better use
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Since late 2000, however, one
observes again large discrepancies between the evolution of the NASDAQ (more
volatile and more rapidly decreasing prices) and the EURO STOXX






















































3.4 Descriptive evidence from firm-level data
3.4.1 EURO STOXX companies
This section illustrates the level and the volatility of return obtained on new
economy and old economy stocks based on firm-level data. In a first step, we
present key indicators for 219 firms covered by the EURO STOXX (from April
1998 to April 2001).
27
Figure 3: Key indicators of monthly stock returns by EURO STOXX sector
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
Contrary to the idea of a crude “high-tech mania”
28 , the high-tech property has
by no means been a sufficient criterion for high returns throughout the period
under consideration. In fact, the TMT segment constitutes the lower bound in
terms of the 25 % quartile for monthly returns. Only at the 75 % quartile level
have monthly returns been significantly higher within the TMT sector than across
the old economy sectors. From April 1998 to late 1999, the fraction of TMT
stocks for which positive returns had been recorded was very similar to the
corresponding share across the 15 old economy sectors (i.e., around 50 %).
Only from then on did the situation change significantly in that almost no
negative returns were recorded among the 34 new economy companies until
February 2000. A full year after the fall back in prices, the share of new economy
firms subject to positive returns fluctuates vehemently indicating very high
uncertainty and a rather low degree of transparency. 
27.I.e., firms located within the 4 major countries of the euro area (i.e., France, Germany, Italy and Spain).
34 out of these 219 firms are listed within the telecommunication, technology and media sectors,
whereas 185 were taken from the remaining 15 old economy sectors of the EURO STOXX.
28.Financial Times, 16 March 2000.
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Figure 4: Intraday spread and daily returns for TMT and non-TMT stocks
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
The intraday spread observed for new economy stocks, too, initially behaved
very similarly to the spread observable for old economy firms (below 4 %). Only
from late 1999 onwards did the intraday spread on new economy stocks rise
quickly and almost doubled. This corresponds to an effective increase in intraday
volatility since the rise in daily returns was substantially lower. The intraday
spread observed for TMT stocks remained high in the aftermath of the fallback
in April 2000. 
3.4.2 A comparison with “genuine new economy firms”
Given the inherent character of the EURO STOXX, its TMT sectors predominantly
include large companies, which do not necessarily reflect the “true character”
of a new economy firm.
29 Unfortunately, the data availability and the recent
establishment do not allow for analyses of returns on “genuine new economy
stocks” on a broad scale. In order to separate the business model effect from
impacts driven by the field of activity we compare two groups of
telecommunication firms, i.e. former state-governed monopolists and selected
newer privately managed competitors (“genuine new economy firms”). Whereas
the choice of the ex-state monopolists is relatively obvious (i.e., Deutsche
29.It is, however, questionable whether size is a characterising element of new economy firms. On the one
hand, the bull period has been understood as a “technology-laden NASDAQ bubble” (The Economist
(2001b)) and innovating new economy companies are commonly considered – along the lines of the
early Schumpeter - rather new and small. On the other hand, within some markets shareholders valued
large companies’ stocks more than smaller firms’ stocks by an increasing margin (Kopcke (2000)).
Anyway, even the more recent high-tech firms reported important market capitalisations. 

































































New economy Old economy20
Telekom, Télécom France, Telecom Italia, Telefónica), the selection of “genuine
new economy firms” is based on the assessment of asset management
professionals of three major Luxembourg commercial banks.
30
Figure 5: Average and standard deviation of monthly returns
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
From this comparison one may derive two conclusions: First, “genuine new
economy stocks” on average benefited from higher return at the expense of
higher volatility. Whereas the “spread” at the 25 % quartile of return has been
almost –700 basispoints, at the median it has been 160 basispoints and at the
75 % quartile level it has been 670 basispoints. The higher volatility across
“genuine new economy firms” may be understood as a higher fluctuation of
returns across firms and throughout time.
31 Second, throughout the period
under consideration, stocks of former state-governed monopolist telecom-
munication companies, on average, participated in a good deal of the return
potential offered by the “genuine new economy firms” and avoided the high
return volatility associated to these.
30.The professionals consulted were asked to name firms which, from the perspective of institutional
investors, are commonly considered new economy firms, representative of their sector and benefit from
a high recognition value. The set of new economy firms includes Nextel Communications, Covad
Communications, Vodafone, KPNQ West, Cisco Systems, Ciena, Alcatel, Nokia, Yahoo and CMGI.
Though, strictly speaking, these firms belong to different new economy fields of activity, most of them
operate within the broader telecommunication business.
31.Vodafone stocks constitute an exception in that they performed better than those of the former state-
governed monopolists “in spite of” lower return volatility.






















































Genuine new economy firms Former state-governed firms21
Figure 6: The distribution of returns: former state-governed companies (LHS)
and “genuine new economy firms” (RHS) in the telecommunication sector [%]
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
As it comes to the intraday spread, again, one observes substantial differences
between “genuine new economy firms” and former state-governed monopolists
operating in the telecommunication sector. Throughout the entire period the
spread had been less accentuated among the former state-governed
monopolists. Furthermore, whereas among the latter, intraday spreads in the
aftermath of the fall back in prices stabilised at around 4 %, they increased
among the “genuine new economy firms” exceeding, on average, 10 % by April
2001. 
Figure 7: Daily returns and intraday spread: former state-governed companies
and “genuine new economy firms” in the telecommunication sector
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
To sum up, the common assumption of higher returns on new economy equity
bought at the expense of higher risk cannot be confirmed unanimously, but
depends on the period considered. This is with respect to the volatility
throughout time as well as that across firms. Some indicators were subject to




























































































breaks already in the last quarter of 1999. Furthermore, whereas some indicators
for new economy equity (e.g., return volatility across firms) point towards a
return to “normal levels” after spring 2000, others (such as the intraday spread)
still reveal a considerable spread.
3.5  On the evolution of price earnings ratios
An important indicator frequently referred to when discussing stock market
valuation is the PE ratio.
32 PE ratios soared considerably throughout the bull
period of the last four years. For example, the S&P500 PE ratio exceeded the
mark of 44 in December 1999, a figure not seen since 1881.
33 Since January
1881, the average S&P500 PE ratio has been below 16, its 75 % quartile ranges
around 18,5. But PE ratios increased even stronger within new economy sectors.
Whereas in early 1995, the aggregate PE ratio for NASDAQ computer stocks was
at around 30 (at a time when the S&P500 PE ratio navigated around 20), it
reached a stunning 260 in February 2000 (i.e., almost five times the score
observed for the S&P500 index). Meaning that, ceteris paribus, one would get
into the black only at an implausible point in time, PE ratios for stocks in general
and new economy companies in particular have often been considered
unreasonable high. Though stock prices decreased substantially since February
2000, high PE ratios are not a matter of the past. It is true that PE ratios crushed
in the aftermath of the turning point in spring 2000, but at least the NASDAQ
computer sector PE ratio is back again to three-digit levels since mid 2001.
34
Figure 8: PE ratios for S&P500 and NASDAQ computer stocks
Source: Bloomberg, R. Shiller.
32.Paine Webber (2000).
33.See R. Shiller’s web site (Harvard University).
34.Obviously, today’s high PE ratios are not fully comparable to those observed prior to April 2000 since a
number of non-profitable firms probably will not be part anymore of the PE ratio sample.

























































































































































































Nasdaq - Computer S&P50023
3.6 The primary market
Throughout 1997 to 2000, the substantial increase in stock prices had been
accompanied by comprehensive initial public offerings (IPOs), notably in the
new economy sectors. The emission volume of IPOs at the Neuer Markt in
Frankfurt increased from € 373 m (1997) to € 13.066 m (2000). In 2000, almost
9 out of 10 IPOs at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE)
35 concerned the Neuer
Markt, whereas in 1997 the share was only around 36 %. 
Table 2: IPO activity at the Frankfurt stock exchange
Source: Deutsche Börse AG, own calculations.
In general, IPO activity at the FSE Neuer Markt evolved very similar to secondary
markets in a double sense. On the one hand, initial returns correlated positively
with NEMAX price increases.
36 On the other hand, the emission volume mirrored
the pattern of the NEMAX index. This co-play may imply destabilising elements
in that during boom periods the incentive to raise capital becomes even
stronger, whereas in recessions there is no demand for capital anyway. This is of
particular importance for new economy firms, since in funding investment they
rely predominantly on investor money. 
37
Figure 9: The secondary market versus the primary market
Source: Deutsche Börse AG, Bloomberg, own calculations.
35.Due to issues related to data availability, the section on primary markets mostly refers to the FSE.
According to estimated figures, the FSE is among the most important stock exchanges within the euro
area in particular in terms of turnover, but also in terms of market capitalisation (The Economist (2001a)). 
36.Initial returns, in the following, are defined as the relative difference between the submission price and
the first trading price. 
37.This reflects the dilemma between microeconomic and macroeconomic aspects which regulators face


























































































Period Total Total Average Median vol/ ret/rel
number Number Share [%] volume Volume Share [%] init ret issue price
1997 36 13 36,11 2 538 373 14,68 51,44 42,00 -0,32 0,34
1998 67 41 61,19 3 228 1 561 48,36 78,61 51,11 -0,13 0,15
1999 167 132 79,04 12 964 6 691 51,61 44,34 13,33 -0,03 0,32
2000 152 132 86,84 25 556 13 066 51,12 46,23 15,79 -0,07 0,37
2001Q1 9 5 55,56 1 670 107 6,39 20,78 6,67 -0,20 0,56
Number of IPOs Emission volume [€ m] Initial return
of which: Neuer Markt of which: Neuer Markt24
Throughout the bull period, initial returns on IPOs had been huge. In a number
of cases they ranged above 200 % which by far exceeded the corresponding
score for IPOs in other market segments at the FSE. Contrary to new listings on
other FSE segments, within the Neuer Markt segment, subscription prices, in
general, corresponded to the upper edge of the book building spread. Only from
March 2000 onwards, subscription prices were fixed within or at the lower end
of the book building spread. Since July 2000, in some cases the subscription
price fell even below book building range and initial returns vanished. 
Figure 10: Initial returns on IPOs and the relative position of the
subscription price
Source: Deutsche Börse AG, Bloomberg, own calculations.
As “aggressive” subscription pricing, in general, coincided with high initial returns
(see figure above and table 2), it seems that the fixing of the book building spread
did not fully anticipate the genuine supply-demand situation.
38 Contrary to the
emission volume, the relative position of subscription prices within the book
building spread and initial returns decreased considerably after March 2000.
Maximum correlation between average initial returns of IPOs and aggregate
emission volume is observed with volume lagging initial returns by 2-3 months,
though the general level of correlation is rather weak. In total, initial returns
reached their maximum level in 1998 (median: + 50 %), whereas emission
volume peaked in 2000 only (i.e., at a time when the median initial return fell to
around 15 %). At the individual IPO level, a slightly negative correlation between
38.The sheer magnitude of initial returns observed at the FSE seems to be consistent with figures from
other stock exchanges. At present, Wall Street’s leading investment banks, including CSFB, Morgan
Stanley, Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs, are under siege from regularly probes into alleged
malpractice in their allocation of shares in IPOs in three areas: first, it is alleged investment bank equity
syndicate desks channelled shares to specific investors in exchange for supporting the value of the stock
in the after-market. Second, it is alleged equity desks channelled generous IPO allocations to investors
in exchange for a proportionate amount of unrelated business. Third, it is alleged banks won business
by allocating popular IPO tranches to potential IPO candidates, including chief executives of start-up
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Initial return [%] Issue price *(-1) (relative to band, [%])25
the size of the IPO and the initial return can be observed. However, one observes
large discrepancies across sectors. For example, the return/volume pattern is
rather neat in the biotech, media and technology sectors and less so in the
telecommunication, software and Internet sectors. Differences across new
economy areas were also observable with respect to initial returns and emission
volume as well as the point in time at which IPO activity took off. For example,
in the Internet sector IPO activity became significant by spring 1999 only when
emission volume within the software segment already decreased. Whereas in
most cases average monthly initial returns peaked at around 200 %, it exceeded
500 % in the technology field. Interestingly, with respect to the peak period of
initial returns, the sectors can be classified into three groups. Initial returns on
telecommunication and software IPOs peaked in early 1998, whereas those in
the media and Internet sector peaked in early 1999 and initial returns in the
biotech and the technology field reached their peak in early 2000. 26
4
On the plausibility of the recent valuation of equity 
4.1 The evolution of earnings and dividends
According to classic portfolio theory, the pricing of equity depends
predominantly on the evolution of earnings and dividends.
39 In order to assess
the equity price stance observed in recent years, in the following, some key
figures on earnings and dividends are provided. 
As for earnings, we compiled data for 219 EURO STOXX firms from the major
four euro area countries (of which 185 old economy and 34 new economy firms)
as well as 1209 “genuine new economy firms” from the following business fields:
Web portals, Internet incubators, multimedia, Internet content/info, television,
cellular telecommunication, Internet connectivity, telecommunication services,
networking products, telecommunication equipment, enterprise software,
applications software, computer services, electronic components, computers
and memory devices, e-commerce products and e-commerce services. 
Table 3: The share of firms reporting negative earnings
SECTOR 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Automobile 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bank 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Basic resources 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Chemical 0% 0% 25% 25% 25% 20%
Construction 20% 9% 9% 9% 9% 0%
Cyclical 13% 18% 16% 5% 0% 5%
Energy 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Financial 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Food 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Health 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 20%
Industrial 17% 16% 13% 17% 13% 9%
Insurance 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Media 11% 10% 0% 0% 9% 18%
Non-cyclical 0% 0% 11% 11% 11% 22%
Retail 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Technology 20% 30% 18% 18% 18% 9%
Telecommunication 0% 17% 25% 22% 20% 30%
Utility 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0%
Old economy sectors 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5%
New economy sectors 13% 19% 13% 13% 16% 19%
EURO STOXX old and 
new economy sectors 6% 7% 6% 6% 7% 7%
“Genuine new 
economy firms” 53% 58% 63% 70% 73% 74%
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
39.Sharpe/Gordon (1990).27
In general, the bright growth assumptions for earnings implicit in the pricing of new
economy stocks have only partially been met in the past. Consider, for example, the
phenomenon of negative earnings. Across the EURO STOXX old economy sectors,
from 1991 to 2000, the share of firms reporting negative earnings ranged between
2 and 5 percent. Within the EURO STOXX TMT sectors, the negative earnings share
has been considerably higher (13 to 19 percent). Moreover, apart from the early 90’s
when the telecommunication sector had not been as deregulated as today, within
new economy sectors the share remained strictly positive.
40 This is in sharp contrast
to old economy sectors, where the share of firms reporting negative earnings was
frequently zero and a strictly positive share was mostly limited to a period of a few
years. Among the 1209 “genuine new economy firms”, the situation seems even
more extreme in that the percentage share of firms reporting negative earnings
increased from 41 % (1991) to 74 % (2000). The share of firms reporting negative
earnings is well reflected by stock prices, in that the running count of stocks whose
prices were rising fell behind that for stocks whose prices were dropping. The market
seems to have had become more narrow, perhaps signifying cracks in the foundation
of the bull market and indicating that already in 1999 for many companies a bear
market had begun.
41 Furthermore, the share of firms that reported but negative
earnings is about one quarter for a minimum of 8 observations, one third for a
minimum of 6 years and more than a half for a minimum of three observations. The
share of firms for which accumulated negative earnings exceed accumulated positive
earnings throughout the period 1991 to 2000 is approximately 75 %. What is not
well reflected by the evolution of new economy stock prices is the evolution of
earnings themselves. Consider, for example, the evolution of average earnings for
firms reporting positive earnings and those reporting negative earnings. Throughout
1991 to 1998 the average of positive earnings did not change significantly. Given
that the share of firms reporting positive earnings shrank during this period and
assuming that firms for which earnings became negative already faced lower than
average profits before, the strong increase in stock market indices observed in recent
years seems implausible. 
Given that pay-out ratios may vary throughout time, the exceptionally bullish
valuation of new economy stocks could have been more closely related to the
pace of dividends rather than that of earnings. Based on figures for 1998 to
2001
42, however, the pace of dividends within the TMT sectors had been rather
sluggish. On the one hand, in 1998, the dividend yield itself had been rather
low among TMT stocks (less than 1% on average) relative to non-TMT stocks
(around 1,3 %). On the other hand, the technology sector was the only new
economy segment reporting strong dividend growth (though dividend growth
within the basic resources sector had been even higher). The media sector and
the telecommunication sector reported below average dividend growth. 
40.Apart from the media sector in 1997 and 1998. 
41.This is also confirmed by evidence from US stock markets. In 1999, the five companies whose market
value increased the most accounted for about 42 % of the increase in the total market value of all
S&P500 companies and the top 100 companies accounted for 139 % (Kopcke (2000)).
42.Due to limited data availability and the small sample size of “genuine new economy firms” with a
proven dividend track record, in the following, we focus on EURO STOXX firms.28
Figure 11: Dividend yields (LHS, [%]) and dividend growth from 1998 to
2001 by EURO STOXX sector (RHS, 1998 = 100)
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
4.2 On the sensitivity of high growth stocks' price earnings ratios to growth
expectations and inflation
When interpreting PE ratios across old and new economy stocks, one must
consider that a couple of variables truly may drive PE ratios of new economy
stocks differently from that of old economy stocks.
43 This may be shown by
means of different versions of the dividend discount model, such as the constant
growth and the multiple growth models.
44 According to the constant growth
dividend discount model, the intrinsic value of a stock is given by: 
45
(1)
where p, ge, P, r
n, r
r, π, E, 0, t denote the pay-out ratio, earnings growth, the
stock price, the nominal equity discount rate, the real equity discount rate, the
inflation rate, earnings, the start date and the time period identifier respectively.
The normal PE ratio reduces to:
(2)  
43.In the following, high growth stocks (average growth stocks) are used as synonyms for stocks issued by
new economy firms (old economy firms). 
44.In spite of the deficiencies of models based on dividends and/or earnings (given that most of the total
returns on stocks usually comes from capital gains), dividends and earnings do convey some information
about stock valuation. For example, a dividend increase is taken as a signal that sustainable earnings
and cash flow, and thus, the value of the firm, have increased. Higher earnings provide more funds
from which dividends can be paid to shareholders or which generate more internal growth through
reinvestment in the firm (Hannah (2000)). The implications derived within this section, however, apply
also to other quantitative evaluation methods (e.g., Discounted Future Earnings, Discounted Portfolio
Valuation, Risk-Adjusted Discounted Cash Flow (UBS Warburg (2001)).













































































































































































































In general, thus, lower inflation and higher growth boost PE ratios of both old
and new economy companies. But contrary to the implicit assumptions of some
financial indicators 
46, the relationship between PE ratios on the one hand and
inflation and growth on the other hand is geometric, not linear, and the impact
of non-linearity may be substantial. For example, assuming 5 % earnings growth
for old economy sectors, a decrease in inflation from an initial 2,5 % to some
2 % would boost the market’s normal PE ratio from 17 to 23 (i.e., + 36 %). For
a strong growing new economy environment (e.g., 11 %), the same inflation
reduction would bring about an increase in normal PE ratio from 28 to 49 (i.e.,
+ 74 %). Furthermore, high PE ratios may even be justifiable according to the
constant growth dividend discount model in case higher earnings growth
coincides with proportionally lower pay-out ratios (see white curve in figure 12
below).
Figure 12: Normal market PE ratio according to the constant growth
dividend discount model
Source: Own calculations.
Based on the definition of the market’s normal PE ratio, four messages may be
retained. First, rapid growth projections may justify very high PE multiples. This
may apply in particular to new economy stocks. Second, PE ratios of new
economy stocks may react much more sensitive to changes in inflation than PE
multiples within old economy sectors. Third, the decrease, which a given stock’s
PE multiple would experience, is highly dependent on the level of inflation
prevailing. Finally, growth stocks’ PE ratio appreciation, however, is a double-
edged sword. Just as high growth stocks are rewarded more in a low inflation
environment, they are punished quite severely if the expected high growth rate
fails. For example, if it turns out that effective earnings growth is some 20 %
below the expected figure, the normal PE ratio for high growth stocks would
decrease - e.g., at some 2 % of inflation – by almost 29 %, whereas for average
growth stocks the PE ratio would fall by slightly more than 8 % only. 
46.Such as the PE to growth ratio, which is defined as the PE ratio divided by the expected rate of growth
of earnings over some selected period.

























Strong growth (identical pay-out)
Strong growth (reduced pay-out)30
Figure 13: The impact of a 20 % decrease in earnings growth on the normal
market PE ratio [%]
Source: Own calculations.
In general, therefore, PE ratios of new economy companies will react much more
sensitive to new information of a given quality. If changes in assumptions about
sales and profit growth themselves are more important for new economy than
for old economy firms 
47, this may transmit into much higher volatility of financial
indicators. For purposes of illustration, we consider the multiple growth model.
One commonly used idea of multiple growth is based on the view that
companies typically evolve through three stages during their lifetime and at
some point in time reach their terminal growth rate.
48 According to the multiple
growth dividend discount model, the intrinsic value of a stock is given by the
present value of all dividends up to and including the period T by which the
stead-state is attained (V





where D denotes dividends (for other variables refer to equation (1)). As a
baseline, we use the old and new economy scenarios illustrated in table 4 below.
49
47.For evidence on this see, for example, the web site of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad hoc-Publizität.
48.These three stages are mostly titled by growth stage, transition stage and maturity stage (see, for
example, Grigoli (1982)). Obviously, the standard three-stage model is not easily applicable to new
economy companies, therefore a different lifetime model is used for new economy companies.
49.Obviously, any new economy company scenario is subject to criticism due to the high degree of
contingency coming with them. The above scenario serves as an illustration, the impact of modifications



















































































Inflation rate Average growth firm Strong growth firm31
Table 4: A baseline scenario for old and new economy firm evolution
OLD ECONOMY FIRMS NEW ECONOMY FIRMS
Stage 1 Growth Stage Stage 1a  Start-up Stage
Rapidly expanding sales Rapidly expanding sales
High profit margins No or little earnings
Abnormally high growth Low pay-out ratio 
in earnings per share (due to high expected profitability
Low pay-out ratio  of investment opportunities)
(due to high expected   Stage 1b Warm-up Stage
profitability of investment Still expanding sales
opportunities) Slowly growing earnings  
(in absolute terms)
Stage 2 Transition Stage Stage 2 Transition Stage
Increased product saturation Increased product saturation
Profit margins under pressure Company begins to increase
Increased pay-out (due to fewer pay-out (due to fewer
investment opportunities) investment opportunities)
Stage 3 Maturity Stage (Steady-state Stage)
New investment opportunities offer slightly attractive returns on equity
Earnings growth rate, pay-out ratio, and return on equity stabilise around 
terminal levels
Table 5 below illustrates the sensitivity of new economy stocks’ PE ratio to
modifications to various parameters. Hereafter, PE ratios of new economy firms
may not only be very high relative to that observed for old economy companies,
but may also fluctuate stronger in absolute as well as in relative terms. More
specifically, a 30 % reduction in new economy firms’ PE ratio may be perfectly
justifiable by a whole brunch of minor assumption modifications (e.g., scenarios
B, C, D and F). “Vehement” fluctuations in new economy company PE ratios,
thus, as such are by no means an indicator of irrational exuberance. Most
contributions focus on the uncertain longer-term projections of corporate
earnings in the new economy segment due to a lack of back data, experience,
etc.. However, this aspect will become less important through time, whereas the
higher sensitivity with respect to macroeconomic assumptions will remain. Thus,
in a new economy, central banks are more than ever asked to strengthen the
case for well-defined and reliable price acceleration expectations.32
Table 5: On the sensitivity of high growth stocks' PE ratio
SCENARIO
ABCDEF G
BENCHMARK GROWTH ENTRY INTO TERMINAL TERMINAL PAY-OUT +0,5 PP
SCENARIO FAILURE BY  STAGE 2/1b GROWTH GROWTH FAILURE BY INCREASE
20% AFTER ONE YEAR  AFTER  FAILURE BY 20% IN
3 YEARS LATER 8 YEARS 20%      INFLATION
OE NE OE NE OE NE OE NE OE NE OE NE OE NE
Stage 1a:
D U R 33333333333333
P A Y 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00
GRO 15 0 15 0 15 0 15 0 15 0 15 0 15 0
Stage 1b:
D U R 2222222
P A Y 1 51 51 51 51 51 51 5
GRO 50 40 50 50 50 50 50
Stage 2:
D U R 75757575757575
P A Y 3 02 53 02 53 02 53 02 53 02 53 02 53 02 5
G R O 1 03 0 82 41 03 01 03 01 03 01 03 01 03 0
Stage 3:
DUR ∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞∞
P A Y 3 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 02 42 03 03 0
G R O 55555555445555
Inflation rate: 2% 2,5%
Normal PE ratio:
27 71 24 49 28 47 25 47 22 58 22 48 21 55
Impact on normal PE ratio:
In absolute terms -3 -22 +1 -24 -2 -24 -5 -13 -5 -23 -6 -16
In relative terms [%] -11 -31 +3 -33 -8 -33 -18 -19 -19 -32 -21 -22
Remarks: DUR: duration of the stage (in years), PAY: pay-out ratio (in percentage terms), GRO: growth rate (in percentage
terms); differences result from rounding; source: own calculations.
Note, however, that most of the elements justifying higher PE ratios for new
economy stocks (notably higher earnings and dividend growth) had not
necessarily been met by new economy companies in recent years.
50 One has
also to take into account that the earnings component includes – apart from
intrinsic business activity growth – elements such as sector specific inflation (i.e.,
corporate pricing power) as well as the potential growth due to margin
expansion and spending of free cash flow on acquisitions and share buybacks.
Furthermore, and apart from the discount multiplier which investors realise by
buying future growth expectations at the expense of current earnings, the
commitment of new economy firms to investment and intangible assets fuel PE
ratios for new economy companies relatively stronger, since the higher fraction
of investment into intangible assets immediately and to the full extent shows up
as costs in their balance sheets thereby reducing accounted current profits. 
50.See section 4.1.33
A third element possibly justifying higher and more volatile PE ratios for new
economy stocks could be lower real equity discount rates. However, given that
new economy stocks are commonly considered riskier than old economy ones,
this case seems but unrealistic. Thus, in spite of the high growth expectations
promised by new economy stocks, according to the IMF, the recent rise in stock
valuation had been particularly strong relative to the historical record. Previous
technological revolutions, such as the dissemination of electricity-based
industries in the 1920’s (which brought about considerable and lasting
productivity gains), did not produce the sharp rise in stock valuation similar to
that experienced within the IT sector.
51 This is although there is still no consensus
on whether the new economy measures up to the great inventions of the past
in terms of an acceleration of economy-wide productivity growth.
52
Apart from these rather numeric factors, PE ratios, obviously, may also have
increased throughout recent years due to common factors. Possible explanations
may include financial innovations that help reducing transaction cost and allow
for enhanced portfolio diversification (i.e., lower equity risk premium),
substantial productivity growth or the tax treatment of corporate profits, but
this may neither explain the strong, asymmetric increase in PE ratios for new
economy stocks.
4.3 On the plausibility of recent price earnings ratios
4.3.1 Microeconomic aspects
One way of commenting the plausibility of PE ratios for specific market sectors
relative to broader market PE ratios is described by the Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter Growth Discounter.
53 This concept basically consists of two steps. First,
one is to estimate a perpetual growth rate for earnings per share discounted in
today’s markets.
54 The critical assumption of the Growth Discounter, in the
second step, then is to assume that at a given point in time, all sectors will have
a market PE ratio, or put alternatively, identical terminal growth rates.
55 With
respect to investment in equities, thus, the following condition holds:
(5) ,  or,
51.IMF (2000a). 
52.For example, according to Gordon, the Internet fails the hurdle test as a great invention on several
counts since it involves substitution of existing activities from one medium to another and/or a
duplication of existing activities and since much Internet investment involves defense of market share
by existing companies, etc. (Gordon (2000)). For a more optimistic view of the importance of the
Internet see, for example, Stobbe (2001).
53.For a full description of the Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Growth Discounter idea, see, for example,
MSDW (2000).
54.This may be done according to Gordon’s Growth Model (i.e., earnings per share growth rate = bond
yield + risk premium - dividend growth).
55.Originally, the period of differential growth is assumed to be 10 years.34
where s, m, g, P/E, 0, T denote the sector index, the aggregate market, the
earnings per share growth rate, the PE ratio, the start date and the end date of
differential growth respectively. From this, one can derive the implicit
assumptions with respect to growth of earnings per share for a given sector
throughout the period until terminal growth is attained. Finally, the implicit
growth rates are assessed with respect to their plausibility. Obviously, the Growth
Discounter idea is simple in that differences in beta or risk premium are ignored,
and so are differences in terminal growth rates post the chosen point of PE ratio
equivalence.
56
Applying the Growth Discounter to the NASDAQ and the EURO STOXX,
obviously, requires specific assumptions. As representatives of the new economy
we selected the NASDAQ computer segment and the EURO STOXX media
sector. As reference markets we use the Dow Jones Industrial and the aggregate
EURO STOXX index respectively.
57 Bond yield is approximated by annual yields
of the 10-year US Treasury bond and the German 10-year Bund respectively. For
purposes of illustration, the risk premium is set to 2,8 % for the euro area. For
the US, it is assumed to be 4,1.
58 The dividend yield is set to 1,8 % for the euro
area (these figures correspond to the parameters used by Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter within their September 2000 Growth Discounter exercise) and 1,4 per
cent for the US market (i.e., the average dividend yield observed for the S&P500
from 1997 to 2001).
59 The resulting yardstick for earnings per share growth may
also be approximated from a macroeconomic perspective. Consider the case for
the euro area: one may assume that real GDP increases in line with trend GDP
growth and inflation increases in line with the Eurosystem’s definition of price
stability. The residual could be attributed to restructuring benefits, an increasing
share of profits in GDP and/or faster growth of the quoted sector.
60
Figure 14 below illustrates the implicit growth assumptions resulting from the PE
ratio spread for the NASDAQ computer segment and the EURO STOXX media
sector from April 1997 to August 2001.
61 Until mid 1999, the implicit NASDAQ
computer growth rate fluctuated around the 15 % level. From then on, the implicit
growth rate increased very rapidly to more than 30 %. Similarly, the implicit growth
56.According to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, such simplifications may not be of high relevance since these
factors may cancel each other out, because sectors with higher cost of equity are likely to have higher
terminal growth as well.
57.The selection is largely based on issues related to data availability. 
58.Obviously, any assumption concerning the magnitude of the equity risk premium is subject to criticism.
The spread between the US premium and the euro area one (1,3 percentage points) is taken from IMF
staff estimates (IMF (2000a)).
59.Obviously, these assumptions may be subject to criticism. However, modifications to the risk premium
and the dividend yield would not change the results materially.
60.Note that the derivation of the reference value for monetary growth in the euro area (as announced by
the European Central Bank Governing Council on 1 December 1998) was originally based on the
assumption that trend growth in real GDP would range between 2 and 2,5 % (European Central Bank
(1999)). Accordingly, the assumptions used here are fairly optimistic. 
61.Series for the EURO STOXX media sector begin in January 1999 only. As regards the NASDAQ computer
sector, no PE ratio data were available for February, July and August 2001.35
rate of EURO STOXX media stocks had risen considerably from mid 1999 onwards.
However, whereas the implicit growth rate for the US computer segment shrank
markedly even before the turning point in stock prices in April 2000, the EURO
STOXX media segment implicit growth differential was still on the rise. Contrary to
this picture, the growth differential for US computer stocks rose dramatically
throughout the recent months (even superior to that observed for the peak price
period), whereas it returned to “old” levels among euro area media stocks. 
Obviously, the assumptions regarding the number of years until terminal
growth, the dividend yield and the equity risk premium drive results
systematically. For example, reducing the period until terminal growth to seven
years would increase the maximum growth rate from 35 to 52 (NASDAQ
computer stocks) and from 27 to 41 (EURO STOXX media stocks). The shape of
the implicit growth rate curve throughout time, though, remains very similar.
Increasing the equity risk premium by one percentage point (or, alternatively,
decreasing the dividend yield by a full percentage point) would imply an
increase of the maximum growth rate by around 10 % leaving the general shape
of its trajectory unchanged.
Figure 14: Implicit growth assumptions for NASDAQ computer and EURO
STOXX media stocks [%]
Source: Bloomberg, R. Shiller, own calculations.
According to Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, the estimated range of realistic 10-
year earnings per share growth spreads from 6 to 12 percent (EURO STOXX
media sector), 12 to 16 percent (EURO STOXX software) and 14 to 20 percent
(EURO STOXX technology hardware and equipment). According to these
yardsticks, one could say that from January 2000 onwards the valuation of EURO
STOXX media stocks became implausibly high. Assuming similar growth
projections for EURO STOXX and NASDAQ computer stocks, the growth
assumptions implicit in PE ratios of NASDAQ computer stocks had been very
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4.3.2 Macroeconomic aspects
Apart from rather microeconomic reflections one may not forget the
macroeconomic implications borne by economy-wide high PE ratios and their
underlying growth assumptions. The most obvious macroeconomic implication
refers to the future share of profits in GDP.
62 Consider again the case of current
high stock prices reflecting above normal growth projections for a period of T
years, after which growth returns to normal. In order to illustrate the implications
borne by a given level of PE ratio, the following equation may be used:
(6)
where r, p, g, gE, PE* denote the equity discount rate, the payout ratio, average
dividend growth, the implied earnings growth rate and the PE ratio considered
normal. Consider the case for the EURO STOXX and assume that:
1. Growth rates return to normal after ten years (i.e., T = 10),
2. As an approximation, the normal PE ratio corresponds to the average
S&P500 PE ratio observed throughout 1881 to 2001 (i.e., PE* = 15),
3. The equity discount rate is equivalent to 7,65 %, where the risk-free rate is
around 4,85 % (average yield of the German 10-year Bund from 1997 to
2001) and the equity risk premium is set to 2,8 % (i.e., r = 0,0765),
4. The pay-out ratio is equivalent to 40 % (i.e., p = 0,4),
5. The average dividend growth rate is equivalent to 3,9 % (i.e., g = 0,039),
where dividend growth is approximated as the sum of euro area real GDP
growth (2,5 % throughout 1995 to 2000) and GDP inflation (approximately
1,4 % throughout 1995 to 2000). 
Figure 15: Growth expectations implicit in EURO STOXX PE ratios and the
implicit shift in the profit share in nominal GDP





































Implicit increase in share of profits in GDP after ten years (RHS, [pp])
Implicit earnings growth per year (LHS)37
According to equation (6), by February 2000 (when the EURO STOXX PE ratio
was roughly 35), the implicit earnings growth rate would have navigated around
17,2 %. Now, assume that, initially, the ratio of after tax corporate profits to
nominal GDP in the euro area would be roughly 5 %. Now, if earnings were to
grow at 17,2 % per year over the next ten years and nominal GDP by only 4 %,
the profit/GDP ratio at the end of 10 years would be above 16 %. A profit share
of above 16 %, however, seems highly unlikely to occur since constraints on
reaching this ratio would arise from social, political, and economic forces. Even
if, as advocates of the new economy suggest, potential long-run economy-wide
growth becomes significantly higher than 3 % because of a permanently higher
track for productivity growth, such growth rates appear excessive.
63 From a
macroeconomic point of view, thus, the earnings growth rates implicit in the PE
ratios observed in large parts of 1999 and 2000 even for broader markets (and
not only the new economy segment) seem unrealistic.
64
63.See Hannah (2000) for a similar assessment. 
64.The US experience of the past five decades indicates that companies’ earnings can grow more rapidly
than nominal GDP in the short run, but over longer intervals they tend to grow at very similar rates
(Kopcke (2000)).38
5
Did preferences of equity investors change?
The strong rise in stock prices and PE ratios raises the question whether investor
behaviour had been subject to change within the last years. Whether investors
have become less risk averse has frequently been addressed from the perspective
of a declining equity risk premium. Apart from the fact that credit spreads
widened and IPOs dried out after spring 2000 
65, another way to illustrate
modifications in risk aversion among equity investors relies on the utility function
concept. This concept assumes that the utility an investor has for money can be
measured by a utility function u(x) determining how much risk he is willing to
take in order to obtain an expected amount of money. An assumption
commonly made in this context is that the investor has constant risk tolerance
over a range of alternative portfolios in the neighbourhood of a given allocation
scheme. Constant risk tolerance implies that the equation for the indifference
curve of investors is linear in a variance-return diagram. This implies conventional
convex indifference curves characterising the return-standard deviation trade-
off, implying that investors require more return to compensate for an additional
unit of standard deviation as the risk of the portfolio increases.
66 One commonly
used utility function in the framework of portfolio theory is given by:
(7)
where k denotes a risk aversion constant. One advantage of this utility function
is that it allows for the modelling of constant risk tolerance. To see this, assume
that the return vector is normally distributed with mean r and covariance matrix
Q. Therefore, the expected return of the portfolio r
p is also normally distributed
with mean m= r
Tw (where w denotes the weighting vector) and variance 
s
2 = w
TQw. The expected value of utility may then be computed as:
(8) 
Since ƒ(x)=1-exp(-x) is strictly increasing in x, maximising utility is equivalent to
maximising:
(9)             
65.Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2001).
66.Sharpe/Gordon (1990).39




Now, given a vector of return r, a covariance matrix Q and a risk aversion
parameter k, one can determine a weighting vector w such that the
corresponding portfolio maximises expected utility. Or, by applying the
observed means and standard deviations for different investment alternatives
one can derive – for a given risk aversion constant – the optimum weighting
coefficients or – for a given weighting matrix – the corresponding risk aversion
parameter. Resulting implicit modifications to the latter then may reflect changes
in investor risk attitude. 
Figure 16: Investor indifference curves by risk aversion parameter
Source: Own calculations.
For purposes of facilitation and comparability, consider a dual investment
decision, where one investment alternative is representative of the old economy
(in our case the DAX30) and the other represents the new economy alternative
(in our case the NEMAX). Obviously, the optimum portfolio allocation depends
on how expectations are formed. In the following, it is assumed that expected
return corresponds to a moving average of effective returns. With investors
combining adaptive expectation formation and forward-looking expectation
elements, moving averages rely on past as well as future return figures. In order
to dampen the driving momentum of individual observations as well as due to
issues related to data availability, the length of the moving average was set to
nine months.
68 In order to avoid (time-variant) deviations from optimum
portfolio allocation due to expectation errors, only effective return figures enter
the expectation equation. 
67.See, for example, the web site of the Finance Department of the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu.
68.Note that the NEMAX has only been established by March 1997. Obviously, the choice of the length of
the moving average as well as the number of future return figures is arbitrary. However, modifications
to these assumptions do not alter the estimates materially. 
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Figure 17: Optimum share of portfolio investment in the old economy
(DAX) as a function of the risk aversion parameter
Source: Bloomberg, own calculations.
As illustrated by figure 17 above, for a given risk aversion parameter, the
“optimum old economy share” in the total portfolio did not change materially
until mid 1998. At that point in time, the DAX return expectations decreased
substantially and so did the volatility of NEMAX returns.
69 As a consequence,
the utility maximising DAX share became virtually zero even among risk averse
investors. From then on, however, the optimum “old economy share” increased
steadily among risk averse investors. By spring 1999, the utility maximising “old
economy share” was 100 % even for risk neutral investors (by mid 1999, this
was also the case for moderately risk loving investors). Due to the very high
returns obtained in the NEMAX segment in late 1999, the “old economy share”
temporarily shrank again, though not to those levels observed prior to mid 1998.
By fall 1999, again, the “old economy share” increased rapidly and, by the
beginning of 2000 attained 100 % among moderately to highly risk averse
investors. By early 2000, only risk loving investors stuck to the NEMAX, but by
mid 2000 even moderately to highly risk loving investors swapped their portfolio
in favour of the “old economy”.
Now, for the purpose of illustration, consider the case of a constant portfolio
structure. More specifically, what implications are borne by an equivocal
portfolio allocation between the DAX and the NEMAX with respect to the risk
aversion parameter? In analogy to the remarks made above, in order to keep
the portfolio allocation constant, initially, the utility maximising investor
implicitly would have had to become less risk averse (until mid 1998 when the
implicit risk aversion parameter peaked at 23). However, the constant allocation
locus illustrates that from mid 1998 onwards, rational investors implicitly
adjusted their risk attitude away from moderate risk aversion to virtual risk
neutrality. Throughout the 1999 summer months, however, a constant
allocation implicitly required an increase in risk aversion. 
69.This is true not only in absolute levels, but also relative to the volatility of DAX returns and the level of
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On the one hand, when interpreting the figures, one must bear in mind that
portfolio structures characterised by minor NEMAX allocations (which were
probably very common in 1997, say 10 %) ex-post were only compatible with
very high risk aversion parameters and it is questionable whether a that high
degree of risk aversion would have pertained. On the other hand, the same 10
percent NEMAX share from the beginning of 2000 onwards would have been
justifiable by means of very low risk aversion (or even risk neutrality) only. Probably,
the period under consideration was not one of constant portfolio structures.
Instead, the new economy share most likely grew due to equity portfolio shifts as
well as newly attracted equity investors. Whereas such a shift would have been
quite understandable from the perspective of constant risk aversion throughout
the 1998 summer months, this would have afforded an even stronger decrease of
the risk aversion parameter from late 1998 onwards (see, for example, the upper
line in figure 18 below for a continuous portfolio shift away from the DAX from an
initial 80 % by autumn 1997 to 50 % by spring 2000).
Figure 18: The risk aversion parameter implicit in an equivocal portfolio
allocation between the DAX and the NEMAX












































50% Continuous Dax reduction from 80% to 50%42
6
Stock prices and fundamentals
The sharp rise in new economy stocks observed throughout 1999 and 2000 led
to discussions – across the public as well as among practitioners - on whether
stock prices were still in line with fundamentals or, instead, expression of
“irrational exuberance”.
70, 71 In order to test the relevance of macroeconomic
fundamentals, but also firm-specific hard facts in explaining stock returns we
estimated a multiple-factor model. Estimations are based on observed monthly
returns for 219 firms listed on the EURO STOXX.
72 The data on stock prices and
dividends were collected from Bloomberg. The range of macroeconomic
variables includes different types of deflators (GDP, services, communication),
industrial production, productivity growth, exchange rates, central bank rates
and money market interest rates. These figures were collected from the New
Cronos database, from the European Central Bank and the national central banks
concerned. The following specification is estimated:
(11)
where rit, M, F denote real returns in month t on stocks issued by company i, a
vector of macroeconomic factors and a vector of firm-specific factors.
Initially, a common panel data analysis is applied to both the new economy
sectors (i.e., 34 firms from the TMT sectors) and the old economy sectors (i.e.,
185 firms from the remaining 15 EURO STOXX sectors). This done, poolability is
tested by means of three tests, i.e. the F-test, the Wald test and by using
interaction variables (see table 6). The baseline specification underlying these
tests includes the money market rate r
m (or, alternatively, the central bank rate
r
c), the exchange rate fx, industrial production IP and productivity growth ϕ
73 as
well as the lagged PE ratio and two time dummies (one from September 1999 to
March 2001 and the other from April 2000 onwards) as explanatory variables.
According to the F-test
74 as well as the Wald test, the null-hypothesis that the
coefficients in both equations are the same is rejected. According to the
interaction variable approach, only in the case of the exchange rate no significant
difference occurs between returns on old and new economy firm stocks. 
70.See for example Fornari/Pericoli (2000).
71.Though, at least among the broad public, the general feeling was that of stock markets having been
overvalued in early 2000 (see, for example, Der Spiegel (2000)), some economists argued that the
market was properly valued at that time (see, for example, McGrattan/Prescott (2000)).
72.For purposes of maximum data availability the exercise is restricted to firms located in one of the four
major euro area countries (i.e., France, Germany, Italy and Spain).
73.Though under particular assumptions capital productivity is the measure most closely linked to share
returns (see, for example, Davis/Madsen (2001)), productivity, in the following, due to issues of
practicality and similar to most studies in this field, refers to labour productivity. 
74.The F-test is merely done for illustrative purposes since it relies on the important assumption that the
disturbance variance is the same in both regressions. The same is basically true for the specification
using interaction variables (Greene (1997)). 43
Table 6: A case for non-poolability
****, ***, ** and * denote significance at the 0,1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
In the following, thus, a two-sector multiple-factor model is estimated by
running separate regressions for old economy firms on the one hand and for
new economy firms on the other hand. 
Table 7 below illustrates the empirical results for non-TMT stocks based on fixed
effects estimation (based on different variable sets in order to illustrate the
robustness of the results).
75
With respect to old economy stocks, the assumption that stock returns behaved
independently from fundamentals may not be confirmed. Instead, it seems that
not only firm-specific fundamentals, but also macroeconomic fundamental
variables exerted a significant impact on monthly stock returns throughout the
last three years. For example, important scores of the PE ratio and/or the PB ratio
in the past significantly reduced current return rates. Interest rates, too, seem to
have exerted a negative impact on monthly returns. Industrial production growth
as well as productivity growth seem to have fuelled stock returns. The same holds
true for a depreciation of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the US Dollar. 
Whereas the sign of the coefficients are according to expectations, their
magnitudes are not self-explaining. On the one hand, though robust in terms
of sign and significance, the coefficients for the money market rate and the
exchange rate vary substantially. Coefficients for the PE ratio, the PB ratio,
industrial production and productivity growth, though, are relatively robust
across specifications. On the other hand, the implications borne by the
coefficient estimates may be questioned. For purposes of illustration, consider
the case for scenario VIII. When evaluated at the median level of each of the
variables concerned (if done so, the theoretical “median monthly return” is
approximately 0,5 %), one may derive the following implications. A PE ratio of
50 % higher than median (i.e., 35,2 instead of 23,2) would imply a decrease in
monthly returns by 1,3 percentage points. An increase in money market rates
75.Given the very parsimonious character of the specification, obviously, the estimates may only serve for
illustrative purposes.by 0,5 percentage points would have reduced monthly return rates by 1,5
percentage points. Then, a 5 % increase in industrial production would have
increased the monthly return by 0,3 percentage points and a 10 % increase in
the exchange rate would have fuelled monthly return by 1,3 percentage points.
Table 7: Monthly returns on stocks other than TMT
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity
consistent. Standard errors below coefficients.
Obviously, the period under consideration probably bears behavioural shifts and
structural changes. Unfortunately, due to the small sample size (at least for the
period of decreasing prices), a genuine separation by means of a sample split is
not feasible. As an approximation, we use dummy variables referring to the
period from September 1998 to March 2000 (i.e., D1) and from April 2000
onwards (i.e., D2). Estimates suggest that there has been an otherwise
unexplained “remainder” affecting monthly stock returns in a significant way.
Estimated coefficients for dummy period 1 are significantly positive, whereas
those for dummy period 2 are significantly negative (though small in size).
Significance, sign and magnitude of both dummy variables are robust across
specifications tested. 
4445
Table 8: Monthly returns on TMT stocks
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity
consistent. Standard errors below coefficients.
Now consider the case for the TMT segment of the EURO STOXX (again using
fixed effects). According to expectations, the role of fundamentals in explaining
TMT stock returns seems to have been less transparent than among non-TMT
stocks. Regressions for TMT stocks seem to be more sensitive to the set of
explanatory variables, the number of lags, etc. and the standard errors are much
more important. This is with the exception of the firm-specific variables, such as
the PE ratio and the PB ratio, where coefficients are significantly negative and of
similar magnitude across different specifications. Contrary to the case for non-
TMT stocks, the role of the dummy variables becomes crucial and this is well
reflected in R-squared. Without them, the coefficients for macroeconomic
variables become doubtful (e.g., positive coefficient for money-market rates). By
using the dummy variables mentioned above one may derive the following
messages. First, increases in money market rates seem to have had a significantly
negative impact on returns. Coefficients are considerably higher than for non-
TMT equity. Second, the exchange rate coefficient is significantly positive.46
Though results suggest a stronger impact of exchange rate changes for TMT
stocks than for non-TMT stocks, the magnitude of the coefficient is not robust.
Third, coefficients for both dummy variables are significantly different from zero
even at high significance levels. In both cases, the size of the coefficient is robust
and of higher absolute value, which is according to a priori expectations. Finally,
neither industrial production growth, nor productivity growth was found to
exert an impact significantly different from zero on monthly stock returns. 
All specifications used hitherto rely on past or current values of the explanatory
variables. Finally, we test whether, according to common theory, stock markets
are rather forward-looking and whether returns on new economy stocks - given
their more forward-looking character - are more so than those of old economy
equity. Abstracting from expectation errors we regress monthly returns on future
values for macroeconomic variables. As for the microeconomic fundamentals,
we refer to the lagged values since in the very short-term only prices will vary.
Results are illustrated in table 9 below for a very rudimentary specification and a
more comprehensive one.
Table 9: Monthly returns on stocks (leading specification)
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity
consistent. Standard errors below coefficients.47
The inclusion of forward-looking elements modifies the picture emanating from
the lagged variable specification in two ways. First, the exchange rate becomes
insignificant. Second, productivity growth becomes significant in explaining
returns on new economy stock, and this is robust across specifications. The two
elements common to all specifications relate to the role of the microeconomic
fundamentals and the relevance of monetary policy (assuming that central bank
signals transmit efficiently into money market rates). In general, results seem to
be more sensitive with respect to the use of lagged versus leading explanatory
variables rather than with the number of lags/leads (up to a quarter) itself. The
question therefore emerges whether returns on new economy stocks are more
forward-looking than old economy stock returns. The answer to this depends
essentially on the availability of longer time series and data on expectations
regarding growth, inflation, etc. and merits further investigation. 48
7
Implications for central banking and conclusion
The emergence of a new economy and the navigation into an environment
increasingly based on more and better information and communication,
incidentally, may augment the uncertainty momentum underlying investor
activity as well as central banking. Any assessment of new economy firms may
be subject to enhanced contingency for a number of reasons, such as the lack
of historical data, the greater role of intangibles and the higher importance of
expected rather than actual figures. But given the forward-looking character of
new economy firms, equity indicators and stock prices may for good reasons
also become much more volatile. Apart from these, the valuation of high growth
stocks may be subject to otherwise less explainable factors (see, for example,
the issue of “spoofing” and the allocation of IPO tranches). 
Central bankers, in particular, are affected in a double sense. Classic portfolio
theory as well as preliminary empirical findings suggest that monetary policy
remains an important factor intervening in the pricing of new economy stocks.
But, on the one hand, due to impacts of stock prices on inflation, the real
economy, and the financial system and given the theoretically justifiable
perspective of more volatile new economy stocks, central bankers nowadays are
more than ever asked to closely monitor stock markets as well as investor
behaviour world-wide. The potential macroeconomic impact of stock market
fluctuations may turn out self-reinforcing in that rising equity prices by
themselves may fuel the passion for equity among the broad public. The
common view of an equity culture developing across the “old continent” within
the next years may be particularly challenging for the European Central Bank. In
monitoring equity markets, it is essential for central banks to separate effects
driven by changes in inflation expectations from those incurred by modifications
to growth projections as well as those produced by changes in risk preferences. 
Furthermore, central banks may be increasingly challenged in balancing supply-
side and demand-side effects stemming from stock market pricing. In particular,
the greater role for earnings expectations (rather than actual figures) may
temporarily allow for a higher spread between the actual condition of the real
economy and the “facial picture” emanating from the stock market. This is
particularly obvious in the start-up phase of new economy firms, since these by
their very nature depend on rapid initial growth (instead of effective earnings)
in order to overcome the contestability issues inherent to network economies.
Higher spreads, in turn, may raise the issue of a “reversion in causality” between
equity prices and fundamentals. An increasing passion for equity may also render
the traditional projection of changes in consumer spending (i.e., by primarily
relying on changes in household income) insufficient. Instead, a change in the
value of equity, similar to other assets, may become increasingly important in
explaining future inflation. Since it is highly unlikely that equity wealth affects49
spending decisions similar to common household income, volatile equity prices
can create serious uncertainty for the central bank. Thus, in order to fulfil its
mandate successfully, any central bank striving for price stability is asked to have
available data on income stemming from equity gains (similar to other forms of
capital gains). Furthermore, central bankers are asked to analyse in detail how
this type of income affects spending and to address the issue of double
symmetry (i.e., whether a decline in equity wealth causes spending to fall to the
same extent that an increase of the same magnitude causes it to rise and
whether the sequence matters). 
On the other hand, the deliberation and implementation of central bank policy
must take into account the increasingly leveraged impact of inflation and real
interest rates on stock markets in an environment increasingly characterised by
high growth stocks. Thus, central banks are more than ever asked to strengthen
the case for well-defined and reliable price acceleration expectations. But, given
the considerable uncertainties surrounding any assessment of new economy
firms, integrating more thoroughly the analysis of stock markets into central
bank policy making (as for example within the second pillar of the European
Central Bank monetary policy strategy) may also increase contingency. Finally,
the common practice of new economy firms to fund investment by investor
money may incur additional problems with respect to financial market stability




Baume, de la, C. (1991): “Gestion de Portefeuille”.
Boone, L./Giorno, C./Richardson, P. (1998): “Stock Market Fluctuations and
Consumption Behaviour”, OECD Working Paper 208.
Brierley, P. G./Kearns, A. (2001): “The Financing Patterns of New and Old
Economy Firms in the UK”, Bank of England document.
Davis, E. P./Madsen, J. B. (2001): “Productivity and Equity Returns: A Century of
Evidence for 9 OECD Countries”.
Der Spiegel (2000): “Das Lotterieprinzip”, 5/2000.
European Central Bank (2000): “The New Economy and Implications for
Monetary Policy”, mimeo.
European Central Bank (1999), ECB Monthly Bulletin January 1999.
Fair, R.C. (2000): “Fed Policy and the Effects of a Stock Market Crash on the
Economy”, in: Business Economics 4/2000.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2001): “The Stock Market: What a
Difference a Year Makes”, in: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Letter 2001-17.
Felderer, B./Homburg, S. (1994): “Makroökonomik und neue Makroökonomik”.
Financial Times, 16 March 2000.
Fornari, F./Pericoli, M. (2000): “Stock Values and Fundamentals: Link or
Irrationality”, in: Banca d’Italia Working Paper, No. 378.
Fraikin, M. (2001): “Werden die 'Neuen Märkte' in Zukunft weiterhin alt
aussehen?”.
Gordon, R.J. (2000): “Does the 'New Economy' Measure up to the Great
Inventions of the Past?”.
Greene, W.H. (1997): “Econometric Analysis”, 1997.
Grigoli, C.J. (1982): “Demystifying Dividend Discount Models”, in: Merill Lynch
Quantitative Research, 4/1982.51
Handelsblatt, 19/20 October 2001.
Hannah, B. (2000): “Approaches to Current Stock Market Valuations”, in: Bank
of Canada Review Summer 2000.
Houben, A./Kakes, J. (2001): “Fostering the 'New Economy': the role of financial
intermediation”, MEB Series, 2001/7, De Nederlandsche Bank.
IMF (2000a), IMF World Economic Outlook, May 2000.
IMF (2000b), IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2000.
Jalava, J. (2001): “The new economy in Finland”, in: Bank of Finland Bulletin,
Vol. 75 No. 2. 
Kopcke, R.W. (2000): “Has the Stock Market become Too Narrow?”, in: Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston New England Economic Review Nov./Dec. 2000.
L’Echo, 8 May 2000.
Lee, J.-K. (2000): “Economic Shock and Structural Change: Is There a New
Economy in Korea, too?”, in: The Bank of Korea Economic Papers, Vol. 4 No .1.
McGrattan, E.R./Prescott, E.C. (2000): “Is the Stock Market Overvalued?”, in:
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 24, No. 4.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (2000): “MSDW Growth Discounter: What to
Expect”, in: Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Equity Research Euroletter, 11
September 2000.
Mouriaux, F./Verhille, F. (2000): “Les difficultés de la valorisation boursière des
entreprises de la 'nouvelle économie'”, in: Banque de France Bulletin Mensuel,
No. 83, November 2000.
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 August 2001.
Paine Webber (2001): “New Economy: Yes; New Metrics: No”, March 2001.
Putten, van der, R./Vergnaud, E. (2001): “Fluctuations du marché boursier et
économie réelle”, in: BNP Paribas Conjoncture, February 2001.
Oliner, S.D./Sichel, D.E. (2000): “The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 1990’s:
Is Information Technology the Story?”.
Sharpe, W.F./Gordon, J.A. (1990): “Investments”.
Stobbe, A. (2001): “New economy in Europe – reality or mirage?”.52
The Economist (2001a), “Global Equity Market Survey 2001”, May 2001.
The Economist (2001b), “Technology Quarterly”, September 2001.
UBS Warburg (2001): “Searching for Value – The Valuation of Biotechnology”.
University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Finance Department
(http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu).